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developed sense of humor). I argue that a sense of humor, as an Aristotelian virtue, is consistent with
Richards’s developmental account of a sense of humor. However, I am making a stronger claim than
Richards; I will argue that the sense of humor is necessary for happiness. In this way, I am filling out
Richards’s account of the role one's sense of humor plays in one's long-term happiness. Since a good
Aristotelian will offer examples to elucidate the intermediate position between the extremes, I offer an
analysis of Richards own writings and behavior as exemplifying an excellent sense of humor, one that has
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Aesthetics, Humor, and Virtue: Reflections on
Richards and the Good Life
Elizabeth Victor
Introduction
In A Philosopher Looks at the Sense of
Humor, Richard C. Richards discusses how one's
appreciation of and ability to create incongruities is a
necessary condition for developing a sense of
humor. One's sense of humor, according to Richards,
can be a component of happiness. In this paper, I will
build on Richards's concept of the sense of humor. I
will argue that Richards account is consistent with an
Aristotelian picture of happiness as holistic wellbeing. Specifically, I will suggest that the attitude
underlying the aesthetic and/or the humorous is a
kind of pro-attitude that must be cultivated (i.e., one
is not simply born with a developed sense of humor).
I argue that a sense of humor, as an Aristotelian
virtue, is consistent with Richards’s developmental
account of a sense of humor. However, I am making
a stronger claim than Richards; I will argue that the
sense of humor is necessary for happiness. In this
way, I am filling out Richards’s account of the role
one's sense of humor plays in one's long-term
happiness. Since a good Aristotelian will offer
examples to elucidate the intermediate position
between the extremes, I offer an analysis of Richards
own writings and behavior as exemplifying an
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excellent sense of humor, one that has served as a
model for others to emulate the kind of play
necessary to "transform a simple incongruity into
the stuff of humor".
Richards’ Theory of The Sense of Humor
In Chapter five of his book, Richards tells us
that a sense of humor is a “kind of aesthetic
experience” that is a playful engagement with
incongruities. He explains, “[s]ince humor is a
response to the incongruous, the sense of humor is
the mental capacity…to playfully discover or create
unexpected and surprising combinations of
elements” (Richards 2013, 71). He employs a
developmental account to explain how one goes
about training up a sense of humor, telling the
reader that attitudes (a sense of humor being one of
them) are “a set of habits with which we approach
life.” Said habits are learned early, Richards tells us,
including one’s sense of humor. We can see
evidence for this in the way that children play with
incongruities—trying on a sense of humor when they
first learn how to tell a knock-knock joke. I was
recently around some small children, and they were
tickled pink by the silliness of the incongruities
within these kinds of jokes. Here are a couple of
choice knock-knock jokes:
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Knock, knock!
Who’s there?
Cow Says!
Cow Says who?
No silly, cow says ‘moo’ not ‘who’
Knock, knock!
Who’s there?
Boo!
Boo who?
Oh don’t cry, it’s just a joke
These sorts of jokes capture what Richards
calls “the sense of the funny.” We might think of the
sense of the funny as a nascent sense of humor. As
Richards indicates, “[t]o become the sense of humor,
the sense of the funny must become habitual… [a]n
attitude involving the development of appreciation
of incongruities must occur” (ibid, 77). From the
habitual “play” with a sense of the funny, we
develop a sense of humor through the cultivation of
the aesthetic appreciation of incongruities (ibid, 7778).
This cultivation of an aesthetic attitude or
stance toward incongruities is what gives the sense
of humor value, over and above a cheap thrill or
temporary amusement. Beyond eliciting “happy
laughter” from others, a sense of humor allows us to
face the difficult fact that we’re all going to die, and
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everyone we know will die, and life is likely
meaningless. The cultivation of the sense of humor,
as a form of art, gives us power over the fact that
we’re mere mortals, and that is something that gives
humor value above and beyond the instrumental use
of humor in, the classroom, or the hospital…or the
bedroom. This stance or pro-attitude that underlies
the sense of humor directly contributes to a person’s
well-being.
Yet, even as Richards maintains that a sense
of humor has a role in happiness, he seems to stop
just short of claiming that a sense of humor is
necessary for a person to be happy. A person might,
for instance, develop other coping mechanisms to
help him through life’s rough patches, building a
fulfilling life without having acquired a sense of
humor. However, he hedges this claim in the very
next paragraph as he states, “I think a person can be
happy without having or experiencing joy and
delight, but it would be a rare person who could do
this…a sense of humor is in almost all cases
necessary for a happy life” (ibid, 114-15).
Richard and Aristotle Walk into a Bar (and they both
say ouch!)
On my interpretation, it seems that
Richards is suggesting that the attitude underlying
the aesthetic and/or the humorous is a kind of proattitude that must be cultivated (i.e., one is not

57

simply born with a developed sense of humor). In
this next section, I argue that a sense of humor, as
an Aristotelian virtue, is consistent with Richards
developmental account of a sense of humor, but I
don’t think Richards goes far enough. In building on
Richards arguments, I will make the further claim
that the sense of humor is necessary for happiness.
Aristotle on Humor
Some might argue that what Aristotle
considered wit was quite narrow, maybe too narrow
to capture the range of funny stuff Richards
discusses. Aristotle goes so far as to hint that some
kinds of joking ought to be outlawed. Specifically, he
states, “since a joke is a type of abuse, and
legislators prohibit some types of abuse, [the
legislators] would presumably be right to prohibit
some types of jokes” (Aristotle 1999, 66). John
Morreal, for instance, interprets this passage as
evidence that “though Aristotle considered wit a
valuable part of conversation (Nicomachean Ethics 4,
8), he agreed with Plato that laughter expresses
scorn.” (Morreal 2016). What is clear is that Aristotle
presents wit as one of the virtues and he discusses
humor in Rhetoric.
In Book II, Chapter 8, section 13 of the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle first presents us with
the virtue of wit. He describes wit as the
intermediate position between buffoonery and
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boorishness (Aristotle 1999, 26). In a more detailed
explanation of the virtue of wit, in Book Book IV,
Chapter 8, Aristotle states that wit is a matter of
character as he says, “[t]hose who go to excess in
raising laughs seem to be vulgar buffoons…[t]hose
who would never say anything themselves to raise a
laugh, and even object when other people do it,
seem to be boorish and stiff. Those who joke in
appropriate ways are called agile-witted. For these
sorts of jokes seem to be movements of someone’s
character…” (ibid, 65, my emphasis). Aristotle
cautions that we must be discriminate in our use of
humor, being sure to pay attention to context and
our audience, as he says that if humor is to
contribute to relaxation and amusement, one must
“…say and listen to the right things and in the right
way. The company we are in when we speak or listen
also makes a difference” (ibid.). In this way, the wit,
as a virtue, is like many other virtues, we must be
trained up through practice and wise counsel.
Aristotle is short on the details of how we
go about training up the virtue of wit, but he does
give us an account of humor that is similar to the
incongruity theory Richards depends upon. In
Rhetoric (III, 2), Aristotle presents us with something
akin to the incongruity theory of humor. He states,
“[t]he effect is produced even by jokes depending
upon changes of the letters of a word; this too is a
surprise. You find this in verse as well as in prose.
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The word which comes is not what the hearer
imagined.” (Aristotle 1941) For Aristotle, the
laughter expressed comes from the incongruity
between the joke and the facts of the world. When
taken in combination with his explanation of wit in
the Nicomachean Ethics, it makes sense why one
would need to know his audience. Incongruities
change, depending upon context and audience
education level, gender, life experiences, etc. For
instance, if I’m at a party with a bunch of MDs, I
might use the pun “Conjunctivitis.com — that’s a site
for sore eyes”, but this joke would fall flat with my
siblings. If I’m in a room full of philosophers, I might
say “Zeno walks half way into a bar…”, but again, this
joke would fall flat with just about everyone in my
family. Knowing the audience is crucial to the apt
exercise of wit.
The Role of Wit in Happiness (Eudemonia)
The link between joking and pain, when
taken in conjunction with Aristotle’s stress that wit
be expressed in the right place, at the right time,
gives us insight into how wit is tied to happiness. The
cultivation of an attitude to see incongruities, and
play on incongruities that appear in our lives can, as
Richards indicates, act as a coping mechanism.
Developing a means to alleviate the tension or face
our own mortality (or the mortality of those we
love), will certainly help us cultivate virtue in other
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areas of our lives. Indeed, if we fail to cultivate an
appreciation of incongruities, we may be deficient in
other facets of our moral lives. Being deficient in one
area of our character may erode other facets of our
character as well. For instance, if we never really
“get” a joke or appreciate a double entendre, this
might undermine our friendships, incite anger when
we don’t get that something is said in jest, or act as a
barrier to being pleasant (can you imagine how
frustrating it might be to not get a joke; being a
person that only laughs for social cohesion?). In
addition, I find it hard to imagine, as Richards
implies, what other coping mechanisms might
function as a sense of humor does. For instance,
exercise is certainly good stress relief, or so they tell
me, and it may help reduce my rage, but does it
really help others reduce stress or face the hardships
of life?
There is an inherent social dimension to a
sense of humor that is other-oriented, connecting to
the sense of political that Aristotle tells us is part of
our essence. Other coping mechanisms seem to
differ insofar as they are self-centered. No doubt,
humor and laughter can be self-centered, but it need
not be. Moreover, the virtue of wit and the sense of
humor, as described by Richards, is responsive to
one’s environment; in a word, responsive to others
in a way that restores our humanity and recognizes
the humanity in others. It is this dimension of the
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sense of humor—the fact that it calls us to attend to
the environment around us and others that makes it
an essential element of well-being. Of course, to
develop a sense of humor, like any virtue, requires
that we have role models to help us cultivate wit.
Developing ‘The Sense of the Funny’ into ‘The Sense
of Humor’
Moral education is an essential aspect of
developing virtuous habits, and Aristotle stresses the
importance of role models for us to emulate. Toward
that end, I propose that Richard C. Richards be
considered a role model for exercising wit,
particularly within professional academic
philosophy. I offer three examples to help illustrate
my point:
Autobiography of Richard C. Richards (on
amazon.com)
Now that I’ve gone through all of the dry
material—let me get to the good stuff! If there ever
was evidence that Richards is a man of wit, let me
submit, for your consideration, his autobiography
that he posted on his Amazon.com profile. I
stumbled upon this beauty while I was getting a free
copy of his book from kindle:
I remember little of my conception and
birth. I assume it took place, but I was not in a
position to appreciate it. It was all just a whirl of
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chromosomes and genes. Plus a rude exit into the
world at Moscow, Idaho. They tell me it was in 1935.
They could be wrong. I had what was, compared
with children today, an idyllic youth, spent in an
atmosphere of no TV and other digital devices,
mostly because they had not been invented yet. We
roamed the fields and woods near Boise, Idaho,
fished, and threw rocks at Neanderthals, who were
plentiful at the time.
A move to Santa Barbara, California, after
the late, great WWII introduced me to the world of
thinking, stimulated and occasionally threatened by
some really great teachers at both Santa Barbara
High School and the University of California, Santa
Barbara. At the latter I discovered my true vocation,
but became a philosopher instead. UCLA put the cap
on my bottle of education, and I spent nearly forty
years teaching at California State Polytechnic on a
one-year temporary appointment. I got all the
mileage out of that appointment I could.
My first marriage produced one son,
Randal, who produced nine grandchildren, who
produced four great grandchildren so far. A
wonderful marriage to Marlene "Marty" Richards
has added immeasurably to my life. The philosophy
of humor has interested me for years, and with
retirement, I decided to write the book, A
Philosopher Looks at The Sense of Humor. It has a
serious intent and a humorous approach. That way I
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can offend a larger number of people: both the
humorous and the serious. My funeral occurred
several years ago, but it did not take. But I got to put
the fun back in FUNeral. (Richards n.d.)
You can’t make this shit up—and yet he
does! It’s glorious—funny, punny, loaded with
examples of incongruities that you have to both
laugh at and appreciate.
Putting the Fun in Funeral
This next anecdote serves as further
evidence of Richards’s wit—it’s not just something
he crafts in writing, but something he has cultivated
through action. Some of you may be wondering
what it means to put the “fun back in FUNeral”;
allow me to elaborate. Now I don’t know all the
details, but as legend has it, some number of years
ago, Richard C. Richards actually faked his own death
and arranged his own funeral. At said funeral, he
greeted people with t-shirts that actually said
“putting the fun back in FUN-eral”! Could you
imagine?
Speaking of funerals—I think Jerry Seinfeld
said it best, “According to most studies, people's
number one fear is public speaking. Number two is
death. Death is number two. Does that sound right?
This means to the average person, if you go to a
funeral, you're better off in the casket than doing
the eulogy.” This is actually true—several surveys
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ranking people’s fears have confirmed that people
actually fear speaking more than death (Croston
2011). Unless you’re Richard, then you speak at your
own funeral!
Author-meets-Critics Sessions
For Richards, the sense of humor is not
something to be checked at the door of academic
philosophy. If anything, that’s where the
incongruities shine the brightest. As some of you
may know, Richards has been a regular contributor
to the Lighthearted Philosophers’ Society annual
conference, both as a presenting author and as a
heckler. He has really has been one of the
foundational figures and has had a heavy hand in
shaping this organization, shoring us up when we
just started to ensure we could continue
philosophizing over the good, bad, and ugly jokes for
years to come. These are some of the many reasons
why we honor him with the Richard C. Richards
almost memorial prize. That’s right—that prize
money is, well, I wouldn’t call it sugar-daddy money,
Splenda-daddy money—that’s what it is!
One of the most memorable
“presentations” involving Richards was the AuthorMeets-Critics session on his book A Philosopher
Looks At The Sense of Humor. Turning the traditional
APA-style panel on its head, Richards was joined by
three hecklers: Tom Brommage, Steve Gimbel, and
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Eugene Zaldivar. Instead of the stuffy, traditional
panel, the author met with heckles and jeers, for a
lively roast of the book. Chock-full of dick jokes, rips
on Richard’s age, and good old-fashioned jabs, the
hecklers incorporated a good amount of
philosophical analysis into their bit. As a member of
the audience, it was fascinating to watch and really
set the example of what this organization is about:
doing serious work, all the while not taking yourself
(or your work) too seriously. I don’t want you to take
my word for it, though, so I’ve garnered some
additional evidence from one of the hecklers—
Eugene Zaldivar.
Zaldivar was kind enough to offer additional
evidence from this author-meets-critics session. In a
recent correspondence, he told me of some choice
quotes that Richards asked to use for promotional
materials (on the book’s website or the book jacket).
What, pray tell, were these words of high praise?
Zaldivar said, “I'd like to start by admitting that I
found this to be a really nice book. It has all of the
hallmarks of a classic. It's printed on paper. It has a
lemur on the cover. It's written by a human with a
sense of humor. Yup, a really nice book. Richard
notes that one can disgust by using humor. Reading
this book is proof that this is true.” Richards was sure
to carefully couch his request, noting, “[m]y editor
may come up with some other dastardly way to use
the quotes, with, of course, proper citation of

66

academic affiliation, thereby all but guaranteeing
that you will be fired and disgraced as a philosopher
and as a person. It would be a favor to me if you
would agree to any part of the above requests. If
not, I respect your good judgment” (Victor 2018).
Zaldivar kindly agreed, noting that he didn’t want to
appear unkind with the “disgust” bit. He shared this
with me for two reasons; as he explained, “[f]irst, it
shows his humility and sense of humor. In picking
two quotes that are clearly meant to be digs at his
expense he shows that he doesn't take himself too
seriously and that he can appreciate humor even
when he's the butt of the joke. In addition, the fact
that I trusted his instincts shows the respect I have
for him. I can think of many other people who I'd be
less willing to entrust with material that is less than
well-mannered” (ibid.).
The second anecdote, Zaldivar offers is from
last year's panel on Steve Gimbel's book, where he
read Richards’s review:
The first major criticism is that trying to
understand humor through comedy is a gigantic,
super-colossal mistake. Comedy is a performance
art. Humor involves the sense of humor in a
wonderful way. Approaching humor through the
mid-wifery of comedy leaves important insights
unaccounted for. Those insights include the role of
the sense of humor in the creation of comedy, and in
the enhancement of human existence. Minor
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considerations, of course, but monumental
nonetheless…With a remarkable grasp of the field of
the Philosophy of Humor, Steven has introduced a
productive new perspective into the philosophical
brew from which the dove of acceptance of the
Philosophy of Humor is now emerging. His
background as a stand-up comedian gives us all fresh
insights into older problems and brings up a few new
ones in addition (ibid.).
As Zaldivar explains, “[i]n the first line
Richard gives a fairly strong critique (he clearly
disagrees with Steve!) but does so with humor and
self-deprecation in order to take some of the sting
out of the criticism. In the hands of a lesser person
this could have been a very contentious point. And
then he adds some very nice comments about Steve
and the book at the end” (ibid.). These examples are
meant to illustrate how Richards has served as a
model of incorporating humor into academic
settings. As Zaldivar interprets them, these kinds of
examples “demonstrate a kindness of spirit, sense of
humor and sharp understanding of the material that
are individually in short supply and almost unheard
in aggregate” (ibid.). Until the Lighthearted
Philosophers’ Society, I had thought seriously about
humor, but I had never seriously exercised wit, and I
definitely didn’t have a sense of humor about
academic philosophy. For me, developing a sense of
humor has been essential to my well-being when
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navigating the bullshit that is the academic market,
overcoming flagrant instances of sexism and
misogyny (in general and at academic conferences in
particular), and the shit show that is “making it” in
this profession. How to do this, and how to do it
well, is something that I’m learning from Richard,
and others who emulate him. Lest this be a big kissass session, I’ll end by saying that I hope to hear
more about how Richards regards the limits of the
sense of humor, and how one could be happy or
have a fulfilling life without a sense of humor.
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